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ABSTRACT 
This paper intends to study the intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversal 
of stock prices by investigating the informational role of unusual trading volume for 
winner and loser stocks. I argue that unusual trading volume has different implications 
for winner and loser stocks. Specifically, high trading volume for losers is driven by 
purchases made by informed investors; while high trade volume for winners could be 
driven by either information or representativeness bias or both. The arguments are tested 
in the paper by showing that in the short run, losers/winners with high abnormal trading 
volume outperform losers/winners with low abnormal trading volume; while in the long 
run, the high-volume premium will be eliminated. Finally, I show that momentum profit 
is higher and more persistent among stocks with low abnormal trading since the loser 
with low volume bounces back slowly but winners with high volume fall faster and with 
greater magnitude. 
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I. Introduction 
 
A large body of finance literature documents that the cross-section stock returns are 
predictable based on past returns. For example, DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) 
document long-term price reversals in which the past losers outperform past winners over 
the subsequent three to five years. Similarly, Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) 
report price reversals at monthly and weekly intervals. More puzzlingly, Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993, 2001) report the return continuations in the intermediate horizon. They 
show that past winners on average continue to outperform past losers over the next three 
to twelve months. 
The objective of this paper is to study intermediate-term price momentum and long-
term price reversal by investigating the role of unusual trading activity in terms of the 
information it contains about future return evolution. More precisely, I am interested in 
the different implications of unusual trading volume for predicting the evolution of future 
price movements for losers and winners. This paper shows that stocks whose trading 
activity is unusually large over periods of a month tend to experience larger returns than 
the stocks with less trading activity over the subsequent 1~2 months. Although we can 
observe high-volume premium for both losers and winners, I postulate that high trading 
volume for losers is driven by the purchases made by informed investors; and high trade 
volume for winners could be driven by either information or the representativeness bias 
of momentum chasers. 
It is motivated by Hong and Stein (1999) to define two types of trading activities. In 
their paper, they define two types of investors: news watchers and momentum traders. 
  1The news watchers trade only on private information about fundamentals, whereas the 
momentum traders trade only on past price movements. Both are quasi-rational in the 
sense that they ignore all other information. 
Representativeness bias was first documented by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). This 
psychological phenomenon describes the tendency of experimental subjects to view 
events as typical or representative of some specific class and to ignore the laws of 
probability in the process. In the securities market, for instance, investors might classify 
some stocks as growth stocks based on a history of consistent earnings growth or good 
performance, ignoring the likelihood that there are very few stocks that just keep 
appreciating. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) build a behavior model based on 
conservatism bias and representativeness bias, and argue that conservatism bias causes 
investors to update their priors insufficiently when they observes new public information 
about a firm. This leads to an initial market underreaction. However, representativeness 
bias makes investors overreact to the good (bad) news when they receive a long sequence 
of good (bad) news. As a result, firms experiencing prolonged periods of increasing 
earnings tend to become overvalued, and those experiencing long periods of declining 
earnings tend to become undervalued. The prices of these stocks ultimately undergo 
reversals as realized earnings fail to meet expectations. 
This paper further explores the implications of representativeness bias. According to 
the Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), representativeness bias implies that investors 
tend to not buy loser stocks since short sale is constrained, which in turn implies low 
trading volume. So we expect to see a low trading volume for a loser stock if there is no 
information. As long as we observe a loser stocks with unusually high trading volume, it 
  2must be because some informed investors are buying the stocks, e.g., a rationally 
managed firm may tend to buy back more of its stock when managers believe their stock 
is undervalued by the market. Their purchase attracts the attention of more investors, who 
then pull the losers back to fair value in 1~2 months and then retain normal prices 
afterwards. I presume the trading is driven by private information and not public 
information because we do not expect a high trading volume if the information is publicly 
available (Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993)). While for losers with unusually low 
trading volume (no information traders), they will continue the path of lower returns 
which is suggested by intermediate-term momentum. 
On the other hand, representativeness bias also implies that investors tend to buy 
winner stocks, which further implies high trading volume. Further more, the stronger the 
upward trend is, the more momentum chasers will buy the stocks, which pull the prices 
up more. Thus, I conjecture that the winner stocks with unusually high trading volume 
are the winners with stronger upward trend, which attracts more momentum traders. 
While for winners with weaker upward trend, the representativeness bias is weaker, 
which implies relatively low trading volume. But high trading for winners could also be 
driven by information. 
Since DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) find long-term price reversal and Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993, 2001) find intermediate-term price momentum, several behavioral 
models have attempted to provide a framework for integrating the two empirical 
phenomena (e.g., Daniel , Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998), Hong and Stein (1999), Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Hou, Peng and 
Xiong (2006), etc.). 
  3Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) propose a behavior model based on two 
psychological biases: investor overconfidence about the precision of private information; 
and biased self-attribution, which causes asymmetric shifts in investors’ confidence. They 
show that overconfidence implies negative long-lag autocorrelations (reversal), while 
biased self-attribution adds positive short-lag autocorrelations (momentum). Thus, 
intermediate-term momentum is a result of continuing overreaction, and long-term 
reversal is the following correction. 
Hong and Stein (1999) show that if firm-specific information diffuses gradually across 
news watchers, there will be an initial underreaction. This underreaction in turn allows 
momentum traders to make money by trend chasing. As more and more momentum 
traders arrive, the initial underreaction turns into overreaction at longer horizons. This 
paper argues that both private information and momentum chase could eventually cause 
stock purchases, which implicitly implies high trading volume for those stocks with 
information or momentum trend. 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) propose a theory of momentum life cycle (MLC) using 
trading volume as a proxy for investor favoritism and neglect. They argue that high 
volume winners (low volume losers) are more likely to reverse in the near future because 
they tend to be overvalued (undervalued) much. Conversely low volume winners (high 
volume losers) are at the early stage of momentum, in the sense that their momentum are 
more likely to persistent in the near future. 
Hou, Peng and Xiong (2006) also use trading volume as a proxy for attention to study 
price momentum and reversal phenomena. They argue that attention could aggravate 
investors’ behavioral biases, such as extrapolative expectations and overconfidence, and 
  4finally lead to price overreaction to information. So they conjecture that price momentum 
is caused by investors’ overreaction, which will be more severe with higher attention, i.e. 
high trading volume. 
This paper contributes to the literature on price momentum in two ways. First, I 
reconcile the intermediate-term momentum and long-term reversal by studying the future 
evolution process of past losers and winners. Second, I show that abnormal trading 
volume provides important information to predict both the magnitude and the persistence 
of price momentum. Specifically, losers with high abnormal trading volume reverse 
faster; and winners with high abnormal trading volume reverse stronger in the long run. 
Conditional on abnormal trading volume, we can create Jegadeesh and Titman-type 
momentum portfolios (winners minus losers) that either exhibit faster and stronger return 
reversal or slower and weaker returns reversal. 
This paper also extends the literature on high-volume return premium. Previous 
studies (e.g., Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001) and Ying (1966)) shows that stocks 
experiencing unusually high (low) trading volume over a day or a week tend to appreciate 
(depreciate) over the course of the following month, and argue that investor attention by 
the unusually high trading volume explain the appreciation. I show that the high-volume 
return premium still exists when using monthly measurement of abnormal trading 
volume, and further show that the premium is driven by different reasons for past losers 
and past winners. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I develop my 
hypothesis, and then describe the data and methodology used in this paper. In Section III, 
  5I present the empirical results, and further explore the economic significance and 
implications of the results. Finally, I conclude in Section IV. 
II. Sample and Methodology 
 
A. Main Hypothesis 
 
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the informational role of unusual 
trading activities in predicting the evolution process of stock returns. In particular, I am 
interested in studying that how the trading activity in an individual stock is related to the 
future price evolution of the stocks. 
As documented above, high trading volume could be driven by information trading or 
momentum chasing (representativeness bias). Trading activities based on private 
information leads to high trading volume and price increase for both losers and winners. 
Then the purchase attracts more investors to buy the stocks until the stock price embrace 
all the information, which implies price increase in the short run. Since the trade is 
information-based, we don’t expect to see price reversal in the long run. However, 
trading activities based on momentum chasing have very different implications for losers 
and winners. For loser stocks, representativeness bias implies that stock prices continue 
to go down. But we don’t expect to see high trading volume with the price decrease since 
most of the investors will just avoid buying those loser stocks, but not short-sell them 
because of the short-selling constraints. While for winner stocks, representativeness bias 
implies that stock prices continue to go up as well as high trading volume because of the 
purchase by momentum chasers. Since the behavioral bias will be corrected finally, we 
expect to see price reversal in the long run. 
  6According to the analysis above, we know that high trading volume for loser stocks is 
only driven by information trading. So we expect to see the price of losers with high 
trading volume goes up to a fair level in the short run. Losers with low trading volume go 
back to fair value gradually so that the cumulative return difference between losers with 
high and low volume will be eliminated in the long run.  While for winner stocks, high 
trading volume could be driven by two kinds of trade: information trading and 
momentum chasing. For those information-traded winners, the price evolution is similar 
to those information-traded losers. For those momentum-traded winners, we still see 
short-term price increase because of representativeness bias, but we also expect to see a 
long-term price reversal because momentum chasing tend to push the stock price too 
high. Taking both effect into consideration, we expect to a price increase in the short run 
for winners with high trading volume, and in the long run, those winners with high 
trading volume will reverse more than those with low trading volume. 
Therefore, we have the following testable hypothesis that: 
 In the short run, losers/winners with high abnormal trading volume outperform 
losers/winners with low abnormal trading volume. In the long run, the high-volume 
premium will be eliminated. 
B. Data description 
 
To test the above hypothesis, I examine all NYSE/AMEX listed securities on the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly data files with share codes 10 or 
11 (e.g. excluding ADRs, closed-end funds, REITs) from January 1970 to December 
2006. I exclude NASDAQ firms from my sample for three reasons. First, the reported 
volume for NASDAQ firms includes inter-dealer trades which make the volume 
  7incomparable with NYSE/AMEX volume. Second, the volume information is not 
available for NASDAQ firms on the CRSP tapes until after 1981. Third, NASDAQ firms 
tend to be smaller and more difficult to trade in momentum strategies. 
Abnormal trading volume is the key ranking variable in this paper. However, unusual 
trading activity could be driven by the liquidity demand (Campbell, Grossman and Wang 
(1993)) or information based trades by a few large investors (Barber and Odean (2003)) 
or trading made by momentum chasers (Hong and Stein (1999)). This is especially 
ambiguous for small capitalization stocks with low average trading volume. I use 
standardized abnormal trading volume (SATV) as the proxy for abnormal trading. The 
SATV for stock i in month t is defined as 
t i
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Where   is turnover of stock i in month t, which is defined as the number of 
shares traded in the month divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the 
month. I use average monthly turnover over the previous twelve months as the 
benchmark for normal trading volume in order to eliminate seasonal effects from volume 
data. So the numerator represents the deviation of monthly turnover from normal levels. 
t i Turnover,
t i, σ  is the standard deviation of the numerator over the last twelve months, which lessens 
the concern that the abnormal trading is driven by liquidity demand from small stocks. 
In addition, size is CRSP market capitalization at the end of December of year t-1. 
Book equity is COMPUSTAT stockholder’s equity plus the balance sheet deferred tax 
and investment tax credit less the book value of preferred stock. Book-to-market ratio is 
  8then calculated by dividing the most recently available quarterly book equity by CRSP 
market capitalization in every month. 
C. Empirical Methodology 
 
To examine the predictability of price evolution using abnormal trading volume, I 
form portfolios double-sorted by SATV and past returns. At the beginning of each month 
t, I rank all eligible NYSE/AMEX stocks in my sample into quintiles based on their 
SATV in the last month. Then I sort stocks into quintiles independently based on their 
cumulative return over the past J months (skipping the most recent month to avoid 
market microstructure effects, J=6, 12). The intersections by the two independent 
rankings give rise to 25 SATV-based price momentum portfolios. 
In order to test the hypothesis, at the beginning of every month I construct zero-
investment portfolios by buying the losers/winners stocks with high SATV, and 
simultaneously short selling the losers/winners stocks with low SATV. First, I focus 
attention on the returns of the zero-investment portfolios in the following month after 
portfolio formation to test the short-term price evolution. To further explore the 
determinations of the high volume return premium, I run a Fama-MacBeth regression of 
monthly returns on a set of firm-specific regressors: previous one month return, prior-
year return after skipping the previous one month, market capitalization, book-to-market 
ratio at the end of previous month, SATV in the previous month and average monthly 
turnover during the past twelve months. Specifically, I run the cross-section regression of 
monthly returns on these regressors in every month, and then calculate the mean 
coefficients over the time horizon. 
  9 To test the long-term price evolution, I study the cumulative returns of these zero-
investment portfolios in the following 36 months. I also analyze the characteristic-
adjusted returns of the zero-investment portfolios. I follow the characteristics-matching 
procedure in Daniel and Titman (1997) to account for the return premium associated with 
size and book-to-market equity. In particular, I sort stocks first into size deciles, and then 
within each size decile further sort them into book-to-market deciles. Stocks are equal-
weighted within each of these 100 portfolios to form a set of 100 benchmark portfolios. 
Then I subtract the return of the equal-weighted benchmark portfolio to which that stock 
belongs from the return of that stock. The expected value of this excess return is zero if 
size and book-to-market ratio completely accounts for the return premium. 
Finally, I examine the implication of the finding for momentum strategies. First, I 
study the evolution process of momentum returns conditional on SATV. Then I follow 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to construct an applicable strategy to check the economic 
significance of the finding. In particular, the monthly return for a K-month holding period 
is based on an equal-weighted average of portfolio returns from strategies implemented in 
the current month and the previous K-1 months. Specifically, I revise the weights of 1/K 
of the securities in the entire portfolio in any given month and carry over the rest from the 
previous month. Hence, the strategy closes out the position initiated in month t-K. The 
return spread between the winner and loser portfolios (past return quintiles 5 and 1 within 
each SATV quintile) constitutes the profit from the price momentum strategy. 
 
 
  10III. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, I discuss the empirical results for testing my hypothesis. In section A, I 
study the high-volume premium in short term and examine the predictive power of SATV 
for cross-sectional returns. In section B, I analyze the long-term performance of the zero-
investment portfolios (SATV5-SATV1). In section C, I further analyze the implications 
of the results for momentum strategies, and then check the economic significance of the 
finding. 
Table I reports descriptive characteristics for the double-sorted portfolios. Looking 
across each row, we see that losers are generally smaller firms with lower prices. This is 
not surprising given that losses they recently sustained. Looking down each column, we 
see that losers with high or low abnormal trading volume do not differ significantly in 
terms of their past twelve month returns and mean price. This observation is consistent 
with the intuition that abnormal trading volume for losers is not driven by the past 
performance, but by information-traders. We can also see that winners with high 
abnormal trading volume outperform winners with low abnormal trading in the previous 
year. For example, in panel A (j=6), high SATV winners outperform low SATV winners 
by 18% in the previous year. It is also consistent with the intuition that momentum 
chasers tend to buy winners with stronger upward trends. Interestingly, we can see in 
every past-return quintile that average monthly turnover in the previous twelve months 
(Volume) is negatively correlated to SATV, i.e. Volume monotonically decreases across 
SATV quintiles. I will show later that it does not mean the finding in this paper is only 
another manifestation of the volume story documented by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 
and Hou, Peng and Xiong (2006).  
  11A. High-Volume Premium (short-term analysis) 
 
Table II reports average monthly raw returns and Fama-French adjusted returns as 
well as the returns spread in the first month after portfolio formation. Firstly, conditional 
on past returns, stocks with high SATV generally outperform stocks with low SATV in 
the following month. This is seen in the consistently positive returns to the SATV5-
SATV1 portfolio. Secondly, the high-volume premium are most pronounced in losers’ 
quintile. For example, with a six-month portfolio formation period (J=6), high SATV 
losers outperform low SATV losers by 1.71 percent per month, whereas high SATV 
winners only outperform low SATV winners by 0.53 percent per month. The difference 
of 1.19 percent per month is significant economically and statistically. The two 
observations are consistent with the finding in Gervais, Kaniel and Mingelgrin (2001). In 
their paper, they argue that abnormal trading attracts the attention of investors towards a 
given stock and then results in a subsequent price increase, and it is especially true for 
past losers since they are more likely to have fallen off the investor’s radar.
1
In order to further explore the determinations of the high volume return premium, I 
run Fama-MacBeth regression (see Fama and MacBeth (1973)) of monthly returns on a 
set of firm-specific regressors. Table III reports the coefficients of various model 
specifications. Model 1 is a benchmark test, which shows that monthly return is 
negatively related to the past one-month return (short-term price reversal, see Jegadeesh 
(1990) and Lehmann (1990) etc), and positively related to the previous one-year return 
(intermediate-term price momentum, see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001)). Also, the 
size effect is marginally significant and the value effect (book-to-market) is strongly 
                                                 
1 Notice that they use daily and weekly abnormal trading volume in their paper, and study the effect in the 
following one month. 
  12significant. In model 2, we see that the SATV in the previous month is significantly 
positively related to monthly return, which shows that this result is robust after 
controlling several firm-specific variables. Model 3 shows that average monthly turnover 
over the previous twelve months is significantly negatively related to monthly return, 
which is consistent with the previous studies by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Hou, 
Peng and Xiong (2006). However, model 4 shows that our result is not another 
manifestation of the volume story documented by Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Hou, 
Peng and Xiong (2006) because SATV still has explanatory power after controlling for 
past trading volume. Finally, model 5 and 6 shows that SATV is significantly positively 
related to returns of both winner and loser stocks. 
The results in Table II and III verify the hypothesis that Losers/winners with high 
abnormal trading volume will outperform losers/winners with low abnormal trading 
volume in the short run. 
B. Long-Horizon Analysis 
 
Table IV reports long-term (event time) cumulative returns of the zero-investment 
portfolios (SATV5-SATV1) in the 36 months after the formation date.
2 For sake of 
parsimony, these results are only based on the six-month portfolio formation period 
(j=6). Panel A presents both raw returns and characteristic-adjusted returns of zero-
investment portfolios for loser stocks. Consistent with the analysis for Table II, we see 
the cumulative raw return in month 1 is significantly positive. Then we find the 
cumulative return declines gradually and becomes not significantly different from zero 
                                                 
2 Since overlapping returns are used to calculate the cumulative returns in event time, the autocorrelation-
consistent Newey-West standard errors are used to compute the t-statistics for the cumulative returns (see 
Newey, Whitney K., and Kenneth D. West, 1987, A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix, Econometrica 55, 703-708.) 
  13after nine months. We can see similar result when we use characteristic adjusted returns. 
The observation verifies the hypothesis that the high-volume premium for losers will be 
eliminated in the long run. 
Panel B presents both raw returns and characteristic-adjusted returns of zero-
investment portfolios for winner stocks. From the analysis for Table II, we see the 
cumulative raw return in month 1 is significantly positive. Then the return goes down 
gradually and becomes significantly negative after fourteen months. But surprisingly, the 
characteristic adjusted return goes down faster and is not significant from zero even in 
month 1, which may mean the portfolio characteristics do explain the high-volume 
premium for winner stocks. And the characteristic adjusted return becomes significantly 
negative only after three months. The observation also verifies the hypothesis that the 
high-volume premium for winners will be eliminated in the long run. Actually, we find 
the returns for winner with high SATV decrease so much that the cumulative returns for 
them are significantly less than winners with low SATV. It may be because the previous 
stronger behavioral bias for high SATV winners causes overcorrection for them 
eventually.  
Figure 1 and 2 provide graphical representations of these zero-investment returns. 
Figure 1 reports the cumulative raw returns and Figure 2 reports the characteristic-
adjusted returns. Both graphs show that the zero-investment return is higher and more 
persistent among losers.  
C. Implication for Momentum Strategies: SATV-Based Price Momentum 
 
Table V reports the cumulative returns of a simple momentum strategy (R5-R1) and 
two SATV-based momentum strategies (R5-R1|SATV=1 and R5-R1|SATV=5) in event 
  14time over the 36 months after portfolio formation. As documented by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), momentum profits are significant for about twelve months and then start 
to reverse. The simple momentum strategy earns, significantly, about a 5.5% profit in the 
first year, and then declines to not significantly different from zero. For the two SATV-
based momentum strategies, we can see the magnitude and persistence of the momentum 
profits are quite different from them. Conditional on low SATV stocks, the momentum 
profit is, significantly, about 6.2% in the first year, and still marginally significant after 
two years. While conditional on high SATV stocks, the momentum profit is about 5.0% 
in the first year, and then reverses to an insignificant level after 18 months. Figure III 
shows the evolution of cumulative returns of the three momentum strategies. We can see 
the momentum profit is higher and more persistent conditional on low SATV stocks. It is 
not surprising given that the returns of winners with high SATV drop so much in the long 
run. 
In order to show the profit difference is economically significant, I calculate the 
monthly returns of all the portfolios for different holding period. Table VI shows that 
conditional on past returns, high SATV stocks generally outperform low SATV stocks 
over the next 6 months. This is seen in the consistently positive returns to the SATV5-
ATV1 portfolio. It is consistent with the hypothesis. Secondly, the high-volume premium 
is most pronounced in the losers’ quintile, which is conjectured to be driven by increasing 
purchases following information-traders. Conditional on SATV, momentum profits (R5-
R1) are higher among low SATV stocks, and the difference is statistically and 
economically significant. For example, for the case of six-month formation period and 
  15three-month holding period (J=6, K=3), momentum profit for low SATV stocks is 0.43% 
per month greater than high SATV stocks. 
Table VII reports two robustness tests for the above strategies. Panel A reports the 
Fama-French adjusted monthly returns, and show that our result is not driven by the 
factors documented by Fama and French (1993). Panel B reports the monthly returns 
outside January to show that our result is still robust after eliminating the  January effect 
documented by Thaler (1987). 
IV. Conclusion 
 
This paper studies different informational roles of unusual trading volume (SATV) on 
loser stocks and winner stocks. I find high abnormal trading volume is following by high 
return in the next 1~2 month. It holds for both loser stocks and winner stocks. 
I further show that in the long run, the price of loser stocks with low abnormal trading 
volume will increase later. Finally the cumulative returns of losers with high volume and 
low volume have no difference. I argue that high trading volume for losers is driven by 
the purchase made by informed investors. This high volume attracts other investors’ 
attention so that the stock price goes up to a fair level, which generates the high-volume 
premium for loser stocks. In the long run, all the loser stocks will go back to their fair 
value. So the premium are eliminated, which explain no return difference between loser 
stocks with high volume and low volume in the long run 
On the other hand, I show that the high-volume premium for winners is eliminated in 
the long run. Actually, the returns for winner with high SATV decrease so much that the 
cumulative returns for them are significantly less than winners with low SATV. I argue 
that the high trade volume for winners could be driven by either information or 
  16representativeness bias or both. Investors buy winner stocks with strong upward trends, 
and push their price to overpriced level. In the long run, winner stocks will revert to their 
fair value, so the premium is eliminated.  
Finally, I study the implication of the finding on momentum strategies, and show that 
momentum profit is higher and more persistent among low SATV stocks since the loser 
with low volume bounces back slowly but winners with high volume fall faster and with 
greater magnitude. 
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 Appendix 
 
 
Table I Characteristics of Portfolios Based on Price Momentum and Abnormal Trading Volume (SATV) 
This table presents portfolio characteristics for portfolios based on price momentum and abnormal trading volume (SATV). At the beginning of each month, all 
available stocks in NYSE/AMEX are ranked independently by SATV and returns over the past J month (skipping the most recent month, J=6, 12). R1 represents 
the loser portfolio, and R5 represents the winner portfolios; SATV1 represents portfolios with the lowest abnormal trading volume, and SATV5 represents 
portfolios with the highest abnormal trading volume. Return refers to the cumulative return in pervious twelve month; Volume is the average monthly turnover in 
previous twelve month; Price is the time-series average of the mean price of the portfolio in formation month and Size is the time-series average of the mean 
market capitalization of the portfolio in formation month. Panel A reports the statistics of portfolios based on past six month returns (J=6) and SATV; Panel B 
reports the statistics of portfolios based on past twelve month returns (J=12) and SATV. 
 
Panel A: Portfolios based on past six month returns (J=6) and SATV 
R1 (Losers)    R3    R5 (Winners)  Portfolio 
Return  Volume  Price Size    Return  Volume  Price Size    Return  Volume  Price Size 
SATV1 -0.22 0.74 13.1  783    0.10 0.52 54.2 2532    0.51 0.70 29.9 2049 
SATV3 -0.22 0.65 14.2  927    0.12 0.48 48.0 2672    0.61 0.63 33.4 1884 
SATV5 -0.25 0.55 14.7 1216    0.11 0.43 32.5 2501    0.69 0.58 42.3 1724 
Panel B: Portfolios based on past twelve month returns (J=12) and SATV 
R1 (Losers)    R3    R5 (Winners)  Portfolio 
Return  Volume  Price Size    Return  Volume  Price Size    Return  Volume  Price Size 
SATV1 -0.35 0.72 11.2  724    0.09 0.51 42.8 2491    0.75 0.75 44.9 2456 
SATV3 -0.35 0.62 10.8  829    0.09 0.47 58.8 2669    0.81 0.68 32.7 1991 
SATV5 -0.35 0.52 12.1  947    0.09 0.43 39.3 2526    0.85 0.62 47.6 1893 
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Table II Abnormal Trading Volume and Price-Momentum Profits 
The equal-weighted monthly raw returns and Fama-French adjusted returns of the SATV and past return sorted portfolios are reported over the period from 
January 1970 to December 2006. At the beginning of each month, all stocks on NYSE/AMEX are ranked by SATV (standardized abnormal trading volume) in 
prior month and placed into quintiles. Within each ATV quintile, stocks are further sorted into quintiles based on return over past J month (skipping the most 
recent month, J=6, 12). R1 represents the loser portfolio, and R5 represents the winner portfolios; SATV1 represents portfolios with the lowest abnormal trading 
volume, and SATV5 represents portfolios with the highest abnormal trading volume. 
 
   Raw Returns    Fama-French Adjusted Returns 
J  Portfolio  R1 R3 R5  R5-R1    R1 R3 R5  R5-R1 
0.0018 0.0104 0.0112 0.0094    -0.0137   -0.0031   -0.0020   0.0117   SATV1 
0.48 4.19 4.14 3.77    -6.79   -3.29   -1.63   4.84  
0.0076 0.0133 0.0145 0.0069    -0.0085   -0.0006   0.0011   0.0096   SATV3 
2.04 5.34 5.29 2.71    -4.09   -0.61   0.96   3.75  
0.0190 0.0174 0.0165 -0.0025    0.0023   0.0031   0.0037   0.0014   SATV5 
4.75 6.86 5.87 -0.83    0.95   2.89   2.80   0.47  
0.0171 0.0071 0.0053 -0.0119    0.0160   0.0062   0.0057   -0.0103  
6 
SATV5-SATV1 
8.19 6.41 3.81 -5.18    7.37   5.52   3.96   -4.39  
              
0.0001  0.0097   0.0143   0.0142     -0.0083   -0.0012   0.0021   0.0104   SATV1 
0.03  3.97   5.16   5.72     -4.21   -1.38   2.42   5.04  
0.0067  0.0131   0.0172   0.0104     -0.0074   0.0000   0.0023   0.0097   SATV3 
1.81  5.25   6.02   4.01     -3.93   -0.06   2.54   4.73  
0.0183  0.0169   0.0182   0.0000     -0.0058   0.0002   0.0030   0.0088   SATV5 
4.48  6.76   6.30   -0.01     -3.37   0.29   2.93   4.07  
0.0182  0.0072   0.0039   -0.0142     0.0025   0.0014   0.0009   -0.0016 
12 
SATV5-SATV1 
8.31  7.08   2.96   -6.01     2.32   2.43   1.04   -1.36  
 
 
  21This table reports coefficients from Fama-MacBeth regression of monthly returns on a set of firm-specific regressors. Ret(-1,0) is the pervious one month return for 
controlling microstructure effect, Ret(-13,-1) is the prior-year return after skipping the previous one month, Size(-1,0) is the log of market capitalization in December 
last year, b-t-m(-1,0) is the book-market-ratio at the end of previous month, SATV(-1,0)  refers to the standardized abnormal trading volume in the previous month 
and TV(-12,0)  represents the average monthly turnover over the previous twelve months. I run cross-sectional regressions of monthly return on these variables 
every month, and then calculate the time-series mean values of all the coefficients (see Fama and MacBeth (1973)). 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
(winners) 
Model 6 
(losers) 
parameter  0.0085 -0.0257 0.0099 -0.0259 -0.0299 -0.0309  Const. 
t-stat  2.06 -7.40 2.53 -8.00 -7.50 -6.69 
         
parameter  -0.0628 -0.0904 -0.0635 -0.0913 -0.1001 -0.1184  Ret(-1,0)
t-stat  -13.21 -17.56 -13.99 -18.42 -17.65 -17.29 
         
parameter  0.0089 0.0067 0.0096 0.0067     Ret(-13,-1)
t-stat  5.43 3.99 6.07 4.10    
         
parameter  -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0004 -0.0016  Size(-1,0)
t-stat  -1.20 -0.17 -1.06 -0.31 1.05 -2.28 
         
parameter  0.0069 0.0059 0.0068 0.0060 0.0059 0.0076  b-t-m(-1,0)
t-stat  15.18 13.43 15.76 14.16  5.78 11.36 
         
SATV(-1,0) parameter   0.0299  0.0297  0.0384 0.0324 
 t-stat    30.61    29.81  29.15 17.94 
         
TV(-12,0) parameter     -0.0048  0.0017    
 t-stat     -2.70 0.91    
Table III Return Determination by Fama-MacBeth Regression 1971-2005 
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 Table IV Cumulative Returns for the Zero-investment Portfolios (SATV5-SATV1) 
At the beginning of each month, stocks are ranked independently by SATV and past six month returns 
(skipping the most recent month, J=6). The zero-investment portfolios are formed by buying the 
loser/winner stocks with high SATV, and selling the loser/winner stocks with low SATV. t is the month 
after portfolio formation. The sample period is January 1970 to December 2006. Panel A reports the 
average cumulative raw returns and characteristic adjusted returns of the zero-investment, buy minus sell, 
portfolios for loser stocks in each month following formation period. Panel B reports the average 
cumulative raw returns and characteristic adjusted returns of the zero-investment portfolios for winner 
stocks in each month following formation period. The t-statistics (in italics) are computed using 
autocorrelation-consistent Newyer-West standard errors (see Newyer and West (1987)). 
 
Panel A Cumulative Returns of zero-investment portfolios for loser stocks 
 
Raw Returns    Characteristic Adjusted Returns 
t  Cumulative 
Return  t  Cumulative 
Return  t  Cumulative 
Return   t Cumulative 
Return  t  Cumulative 
Return  t  Cumulative 
Return 
1  0.0171 13 0.0094 25 0.0139   1  0.0138 13 0.0117 25 0.0013 
  8.19    0.91    0.91     7.48    1.34    0.10 
2  0.0201 14 0.0114 26 0.0197   2  0.0149 14 0.0116 26 0.0044 
  6.16    1.03    1.31     5.00    1.31    0.34 
3  0.0209 15 0.0075 27 0.0176   3  0.0152 15 0.0078 27 0.0038 
  5.14    0.69    1.13     3.92    0.88    0.28 
4  0.0192 16 0.0077 28 0.0160   4  0.0145 16 0.0088 28 -0.0003 
  3.85    0.70    1.10     3.04    0.97    -0.02 
5  0.0180 17 0.0084 29 0.0124   5  0.0130 17 0.0083 29 -0.0031 
  2.91    0.72    0.82     2.30    0.84    -0.22 
6  0.0187 18 0.0104 30 0.0117   6  0.0137 18 0.0092 30 -0.0027 
  2.62    0.84    0.76     2.14    0.87    -0.18 
7  0.0194 19 0.0107 31 0.0109   7  0.0135 19 0.0088 31 -0.0043 
  2.42    0.82    0.67     1.97    0.80    -0.29 
8  0.0176 20 0.0071 32 0.0121   8  0.0124 20 0.0048 32 -0.0045 
  1.99    0.52    0.70     1.73    0.43    -0.29 
9  0.0194 21 0.0095 33 0.0119   9  0.0142 21 0.0052 33 -0.0046 
  1.98    0.66    0.66     1.92    0.46    -0.28 
10 0.0165 22 0.0050 34 0.0106   10 0.0136 22 0.0023 34 -0.0075 
  1.59    0.34    0.56     1.73    0.20    -0.45 
11 0.0129 23 0.0046 35 0.0086   11 0.0121 23 0.0026 35 -0.0109 
  1.25    0.30    0.43     1.53    0.22    -0.67 
12 0.0056 24 0.0066 36 0.0048   12 0.0112 24 0.0022 36 -0.0136 
  0.55    0.43    0.22     1.35    0.18    -0.87 
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Raw Returns    Characteristic Adjusted Returns 
t  Cumulative 
Return  t  Cumulative 
Return  t  Cumulative 
Return   t Cumulative 
Return  t  Cumulative 
Return  t  Cumulative 
Return 
1  0.0053 13 -0.0085 25 -0.0375   1  0.0007 13 -0.0198 25 -0.0351 
  3.81    -1.00    -2.86     0.47    -3.10    -3.05 
2  0.0063 14 -0.0106 26 -0.0395   2  -0.0014 14 -0.0208 26 -0.0356 
  2.80    -1.20    -2.96     -0.68    -3.06    -2.92 
3  0.0072 15 -0.0159 27 -0.0440   3  -0.0027 15 -0.0230 27 -0.0364 
  2.36    -1.69    -3.06     -1.02    -3.12    -2.77 
4  0.0065 16 -0.0183 28 -0.0467   4  -0.0059 16 -0.0239 28 -0.0377 
  1.74    -1.85    -3.21     -1.91    -3.11    -2.78 
5  0.0059 17 -0.0220 29 -0.0488   5  -0.0071 17 -0.0264 29 -0.0374 
  1.39    -2.07    -3.22     -1.89    -3.10    -2.65 
6  0.0040 18 -0.0236 30 -0.0496   6  -0.0081 18 -0.0282 30 -0.0371 
  0.79    -2.18    -3.26     -1.98    -3.26    -2.61 
7  -0.0003 19 -0.0274 31 -0.0496   7  -0.0112 19 -0.0304 31 -0.0384 
  -0.06    -2.37    -3.11     -2.54    -3.40    -2.51 
8  -0.0030 20 -0.0295 32 -0.0519   8  -0.0155 20 -0.0336 32 -0.0393 
  -0.54    -2.48    -3.12     -3.32    -3.48    -2.50 
9  -0.0028 21 -0.0313 33 -0.0509   9  -0.0163 21 -0.0335 33 -0.0356 
  -0.44    -2.54    -2.95     -3.19    -3.31    -2.30 
10 -0.0046 22 -0.0349 34 -0.0521   10 -0.0172 22 -0.0343 34 -0.0375 
  -0.68    -2.84    -2.96     -3.18    -3.33    -2.37 
11 -0.0061 23 -0.0369 35 -0.0535   11 -0.0175 23 -0.0363 35 -0.0370 
  -0.84    -3.03    -3.06     -3.10    -3.21    -2.26 
12 -0.0071 24 -0.0361 36 -0.0536   12 -0.0190 24 -0.0341 36 -0.0362 
  -0.94    -2.81    -2.79     -3.23    -2.97    -2.09 
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Table V Cumulative Momentum Profits for Three Momentum Strategies 
The average cumulative raw returns of the three momentum portfolios in each month following formation 
period are reported. At the beginning of each month, stocks are ranked independently by SATV and past 
six month returns (skipping the most recent month, J=6). The simple momentum portfolio is formed by 
buying the loser, and selling the winner. The high/low SATV momentum portfolio is formed by buying 
the loser with high/low SATV, and selling the winner high/low SATV. t is the month after portfolio 
formation. The sample period is January 1970 to December 2006. The t-statistics (in italics) are computed 
using autocorrelation-consistent Newyer-West standard errors (see Newyer and West (1987)). 
 
Portfolios  t+1  t+1:t+6 t+1:t+12 t+1:t+18 t+1:t+24 t+1:t+30 t+1:t+36 
0.0094  0.0477  0.0623 0.0508 0.0602 0.0563 0.0482  Low SATV 
(R5-R1|SATV=1)  3.77  5.00  3.35 1.86 1.75 1.26 0.82 
-0.0025  0.0330  0.0496 0.0169 0.0175 -0.0050  -0.0101  High SATV 
(R5-R1|SATV=5)  -0.83  2.78 2.12  0.57  0.52 -0.12 -0.17 
0.0055  0.0445  0.0551 0.0288 0.0275 0.0096 -0.0010 
Simple Momentum 
2.22  4.64  2.69 1.01 0.79 0.21 -0.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table VI Monthly Returns for Portfolios Based on Abnormal Trading Volume and Price Momentum 
Average monthly returns on portfolios sorted by SATV and past returns are reported over the period from January 1970 to December 2006 for various holding 
periods. At the beginning of each month, all available stocks in NYSE/AMEX are ranked independently by ATV and returns over the past J month (skipping the 
most recent month, J=6, 12). The equal-weighted monthly returns on these double-sorted portfolios are computed for three holding periods: K=one, three, or six 
months. R1 represents the loser portfolio, and R5 represents the winner portfolios; ATV1 represents portfolios with the lowest abnormal trading volume, and 
ATV5 represents portfolios with the highest abnormal trading volume.  
 
 
   K=1  K=3  K=6 
J  Portfolio R1 R3 R5  R5-R1    R1 R3 R5  R5-R1    R1 R3 R5  R5-R1 
0.0018 0.0104 0.0112 0.0094    0.0063   0.0121   0.0138   0.0075     0.0084   0.0132   0.0164  0.0080   SATV1 
0.48 4.19 4.14 3.77    1.67   4.91   5.19   3.10     2.27   5.41   6.19   3.68  
0.0076 0.0133 0.0145 0.0069    0.0083   0.0133   0.0149   0.0066     0.0095   0.0143   0.0167  0.0073   SATV3 
2.04 5.34 5.29 2.71    2.24   5.45   5.44   2.77     2.64   5.92   6.11   3.48  
0.0190 0.0174 0.0165 -0.0025    0.0128   0.0150   0.0160   0.0032     0.0110   0.0144   0.0169  0.0058   SATV5 
4.75 6.86 5.87 -0.83    3.52   6.24   5.71   1.30     3.19   6.11   6.11   2.68  
0.0171 0.0071 0.0053 -0.0119    0.0064   0.0029   0.0022   -0.0043    0.0026   0.0012   0.0005  -0.0021 
6 
5-1 
8.19 6.41 3.81 -5.18    5.05   4.26   2.08   -2.85     2.45   2.23   0.59   -1.76  
                     
0.0001  0.0097   0.0143   0.0142     0.0056   0.0122   0.0155   0.0098     0.0094   0.0135   0.0157  0.0063   SATV1 
0.03  3.97   5.16   5.72     1.50   5.02   5.79   3.98     2.48   5.68   5.97   2.60  
0.0067  0.0131   0.0172   0.0104     0.0083   0.0130   0.0163   0.0079     0.0106   0.0141   0.0165  0.0060   SATV3 
1.81  5.25   6.02   4.01     2.23   5.30   5.78   3.27     2.82   5.86   5.99   2.53  
0.0183  0.0169   0.0182   0.0000     0.0127   0.0147   0.0165   0.0038     0.0120   0.0144   0.0163  0.0043   SATV5 
4.48  6.76   6.30   -0.01     3.37   6.21   5.78   1.45     3.30   6.23   5.81   1.75  
0.0182  0.0072   0.0039   -0.0142    0.0070   0.0025   0.0010   -0.0060    0.0026   0.0010   0.0006  -0.0020 
12 
5-1 
8.31  7.08   2.96   -6.01     5.43   3.66   1.00   -4.05     2.46   1.71   0.72   -1.64  
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Table VII Monthly Returns for Portfolios Based on Abnormal Trading Volume and Price Momentum: Robustness Tests 
This table presents results for robustness tests on portfolios sorted by SATV and past returns are reported over the period from January 1970 to December 2006 
for various holding periods. At the beginning of each month, all available stocks in NYSE/AMEX are ranked independently by ATV and returns over the past J 
month (skipping the most recent month, J=6, 12). The equal-weighted monthly returns on these double-sorted portfolios are computed for three holding periods: 
K=one, three, or six months. R1 represents the loser portfolio, and R5 represents the winner portfolios; ATV1 represents portfolios with the lowest abnormal 
trading volume, and ATV5 represents portfolios with the highest abnormal trading volume. Panel A reports Fama-French three factor adjusted returns. Panel B 
reports the returns after eliminating the January effect. 
 
Panel A: Fama-French Three Factor Adjusted Monthly Returns 
 
   K=1  K=3   K=6 
J  Portfolio R1 R3 R5  R5-R1    R1 R3 R5  R5-R1    R1 R3 R5  R5-R1 
-0.0137   -0.0031   -0.0020  0.0117     -0.0096  -0.0017  0.0004   0.0101     -0.0083 -0.0012 0.0021 0.0104    SATV1 
-6.79   -3.29   -1.63   4.84     -4.69   -1.89   0.44   4.34     -4.21   -1.38   2.42   5.04  
-0.0085   -0.0006   0.0011   0.0096     -0.0080  -0.0004  0.0015   0.0095     -0.0074  0.0000   0.0023  0.0097   SATV3 
-4.09   -0.61   0.96   3.75     -4.05   -0.54   1.54   4.04     -3.93   -0.06   2.54   4.73  
0.0023   0.0031   0.0037   0.0014     -0.0033  0.0014   0.0030   0.0063     -0.0058  0.0002   0.0030  0.0088   SATV5 
0.95   2.89   2.80   0.47     -1.75   1.75   2.63   2.57     -3.37   0.29   2.93   4.07  
0.0160   0.0062   0.0057   -0.0103    0.0063   0.0031   0.0026   -0.0038    0.0025   0.0014   0.0009  -0.0016 
6 
5-1 
7.37   5.52   3.96   -4.39     4.83   4.34   2.40   -2.49     2.32   2.43   1.04   -1.36  
                      
-0.0083   -0.0012   0.0021   0.0104     -0.0107  -0.0013  0.0027   0.0134     -0.0081 -0.0006 0.0025 0.0106    SATV1 
-4.21   -1.38   2.42   5.04     -5.26   -1.49   2.63   5.75     -4.03   -0.76   2.67   4.79  
-0.0074   0.0000   0.0023   0.0097     -0.0083  -0.0008  0.0032   0.0115     -0.0072 -0.0003 0.0028 0.0100    SATV3 
-3.93   -0.06   2.54   4.73     -4.22   -0.97   2.96   4.92     -3.60   -0.38   2.76   4.49  
-0.0058   0.0002   0.0030   0.0088     -0.0039  0.0012   0.0038   0.0076     -0.0056  0.0004   0.0028  0.0084   SATV5 
-3.37   0.29   2.93   4.07     -1.97   1.55   3.21   3.00     -3.05   0.53   2.55   3.60  
0.0025   0.0014   0.0009   -0.0016    0.0068   0.0026   0.0011   -0.0057    0.0025   0.0010   0.0003  -0.0022 
12 
5-1 
2.32   2.43   1.04   -1.36     5.06   3.66   1.06   -3.75     2.29   1.77   0.35   -1.79  
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Panel B: Monthly Returns outside January 
 
   K=1  K=3   K=6 
J  Portfolio R1 R3 R5  R5-R1    R1 R3 R5  R5-R1    R1 R3 R5  R5-R1 
-0.0041   0.0083   0.0094   0.0135     -0.0015  0.0093   0.0113   0.0128     0.0003   0.0102   0.0134  0.0130   SATV1 
-1.14   3.36   3.34   5.89     -0.45   3.88   4.16   6.29     0.10   4.34   5.06   7.21  
-0.0001   0.0098   0.0118   0.0119     0.0001   0.0101   0.0121   0.0121     0.0012   0.0110   0.0135  0.0122   SATV3 
-0.02   4.07   4.20   5.19     0.02   4.26   4.34   6.19     0.39   4.72   4.92   7.14  
0.0092   0.0138   0.0140   0.0049     0.0053   0.0122   0.0138   0.0085     0.0046   0.0117   0.0145  0.0099   SATV5 
2.66   5.79   4.86   2.02     1.58   5.13   4.79   4.05     1.41   5.04   5.12   5.15  
0.0133   0.0054   0.0047   -0.0086    0.0068   0.0029   0.0026   -0.0042    0.0042   0.0015   0.0011  -0.0031 
6 
5-1 
6.86   5.24   3.24   -3.83     5.24   4.11   2.43   -2.76     4.09   2.79   1.30   -2.60  
                      
-0.0053   0.0075   0.0126   0.0179     -0.0022  0.0093   0.0132   0.0154     0.0008   0.0107   0.0135  0.0127   SATV1 
-1.50   3.04   4.43   7.55     -0.65   3.94   4.85   7.10     0.23   4.66   5.05   6.28  
-0.0014   0.0097   0.0145   0.0159     -0.0002  0.0097   0.0135   0.0137     0.0015   0.0109   0.0138  0.0123   SATV3 
-0.40   4.02   5.06   7.14     -0.06   4.09   4.71   6.73     0.45   4.71   4.95   6.36  
0.0085   0.0135   0.0161   0.0075     0.0048   0.0120   0.0145   0.0097     0.0046   0.0120   0.0143  0.0097   SATV5 
2.38   5.59   5.42   2.78     1.38   5.10   4.93   4.24     1.37   5.21   4.97   4.47  
0.0138   0.0060   0.0035   -0.0103    0.0070   0.0027   0.0013   -0.0057    0.0038   0.0013   0.0009  -0.0030 
12 
5-1 
6.68   5.99   2.52   -4.51     5.30   3.94   1.35   -3.93     3.72   2.43   1.01   -2.51  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure I: Cumulative Raw Returns for the Zero-investment Portfolios 
(SATV5-SATV1) 
This figure shows event-time cumulative raw returns for the zero-investment, buy minus sell, portfolios. 
At the beginning of each month, stocks are ranked independently by SATV and past six month returns 
(skipping the most recent month, J=6). The zero-investment portfolios are formed by buying the 
loser/winner stocks with high SATV, and selling the loser/winner stocks with low SATV. t is the month 
after portfolio formation. The sample period is January 1970 to December 2006. 
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Figure II: Characteristic-adjusted Returns for the Zero-investment Portfolios 
(SATV5-SATV1) 
This figure shows event-time cumulative characteristic-adjusted returns for the zero-investment, buy 
minus sell, portfolios. At the beginning of each month, stocks are ranked independently by SATV and past 
six month returns (skipping the most recent month, J=6). The zero-investment portfolios are formed by 
buying the loser/winner stocks with high SATV, and selling the loser/winner stocks with low SATV. The 
adjustment employ a characteristic-based matching procedure which accounts for the return premium 
associated with size and book-to-market following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997). t is the 
month after portfolio formation. The sample period is January 1970 to December 2006. 
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Figure III: Momentum Profits for Three Momentum Strategies 
This figure shows event-time cumulative returns for three momentum strategies. At the beginning of each 
month, stocks are ranked independently by SATV and past six month returns (skipping the most recent 
month, J=6). The simple momentum portfolio is formed by buying the loser, and selling the winner. The 
high/low SATV momentum portfolio is formed by buying the loser with high/low SATV, and selling the 
winner high/low SATV. t is the month after portfolio formation. The sample period is January 1970 to 
December 2006. 
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